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HOW VOLUNTARY IS THE VOLUNTARY
COMMITMENT OF MINORS? DISPARITIES IN THE
TREATMENT OF CHILDREN AND ADULTS UNDER
NEW YORKS CIVIL COMMITMENT LAW
INTRODUCTION
Between 1980 and 1984 the admission rate of adolescents
to private psychiatric hospitals increased more than four-fold
despite a general decline in admissions of adolescents to state
and county mental hospitals.' This increase may be due, in
part, to the movement away from placing children in the juve-
nile criminal justice system and toward viewing troublesome
children as needing psychiatric care rather than punishment.2
Private mental hospitals have reacted to this increase-and at
the same time have contributed to it--by creating a lucrative
market for their services that often targets youth who are not
in need of inpatient psychiatric treatment.3 Media accounts
and congressional testimony depict an industry that will go to
extreme lengths-including aggressive advertising campaigns,
infiltration of schools and Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, and
questionable (if not fraudulent) diagnoses-to attract and keep
new adolescent patients.4
' Lois A. Weithorn, Mental Hospitalization of Troublesome Youth: An Analysis
of Skyrocketing Admission Rates, 40 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1988). In her seminal
article on civil commitment of youth, Weithom suggests that "trans.institutionaliza-
tion," the movement of youth in need of care from one type of institution to an-
other, accounts in part for the increase in admissions of minors to mental health
facilities. Id, at 805.
2 See id. at 799.
1 See The Profits of Misery: How Inpatient Psychiatric Treatment Biths the Sys-
tem and Betrays Our Trust, Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on Children,
Youth and Families, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 310-12 (1991) [hereinafter Profits of
Misery] (letter of Richard L. Cohen, M.D., President of the Academy of Child and
Adolescent Psychiatry recognizing that insurance fraud and abuse, including pa-
tient "bounty hunting," exists in the adolescent health care industry); see also in-
fra notes 206-219 and accompanying text.
'See Alex Beasley, Priuate Hospitals-Few Rules But Many Patients, ORIMO
SENTINEL, May 22, 1990, at Al; Geoffrey Cowley et al., Money Madness, NEWS-
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Whatever the cause, committing teenagers to private men-
tal hospitals has become increasingly popular in recent years,
and is frequently used to manage troublesome adolescent be-
havior rather than to treat serious mental illness.6 Some par-
ents appear willing to take the extreme step of committing
their children to psychiatric institutions due to behavior that
clearly does not require such treatment,6 and these children
are often powerless to prevent it. 7
WEEK, Nov. 4, 1991, at 50; Nina Darnton, Committed Youth, NEWSWEEK, July 31,
1989, at 66; Susan Moffat, Healing Patients, or Profits; Pressures on Private Psy-
chiatric Hospitals Have Led to Aggressive Recruiting of Patients, L.A. TaIEs, Feb.
2, 1992, at Al.
' Weithorn, supra note 1, at 774; see, e.g., Patti Jones, "Don't Put Me Away,
Mom, Please!" Committing Teens to Private Mental Hospitals, REDBOOK, Oct. 1990,
at 140 ("Statistics from the National Institute of Mental Health ... show that in
1980 there were 128 kids under 18 undergoing inpatient psychiatric care for every
100,000. By 1985, it was 440 per 100,000-or 112,000 kids nationally ... an
increase of 343 percent.").
0 See Darnton, supra note 4; Ruth Padawer, Coming Out, Coming Home for
Some Parents of Gay Children, Shock Has Given Way to Support, THE RECORD
(Northern New Jersey ed.), July 2, 1995, at Li (director of gay support group
noting that "it's not even unusual" for parents to institutionalize their gay children
solely because of their sexual orientation).
" See Profits of Misery, supra note 3, at 343-48 (letter of Barbara Demming
Lurie, Program Director, Patients' Rights and Advocacy Services, County of Los
Angeles, Department of Mental Health, stating that adolescents may be deemed
voluntary patients even if they are "dragged kicking and screaming" into the hos-
pital). The commitment of Stephanie Hobbs, a sixteen-year old from Minneapolis,
is in many ways representative of the type of hospitalization that constitutes this
increase. Stephanie's parents committed her to the Golden Valley Health Center, a
private hospital outside of Minneapolis, when her mother suspected that Stephanie
was abusing drugs or alcohol and became concerned over her rebellious behavior.
The day Stephanie was committed to Golden Valley, her parents told her only
that she was going to the hospital to see a doctor. Her stay, which was initially
scheduled to last one month to treat her alleged chemical dependency, lasted six
months. Despite the initial diagnosis of chemical dependency and a recommended
treatment of group and family therapy, Stephanie's behavior worsened while at
Golden Valley. She was eventually rediagnosed as a borderline personality, was
considered a suicide threat and was given a powerful, antipsychotic drug, Haldol,
Upon learning of both the Haldol treatment and Stephanie's transfer from the
chemical dependency unit to the "psyche" unit, Stephanie's parents immediately
attempted to remove her from Golden Valley. Although her doctors threatened to
petition the court to have Stephanie committed to a state institution if her par-
ents attempted to remove her, they eventually obtained her release. At the end of
the six-month contract for Stephanie's commitment, she was admitted to the Mayo
Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota, for evaluation. There she was diagnosed as having
normal teenage adjustment problems with no sign of a borderline personality dis-
order. Doctors at the Mayo Clinic found that rather than treating her adjustment
problems, Stephanie's stay at Golden Valley had aggravated these problems to the
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While the Supreme Court has extended due process
protections to minors who face incarceration through juvenile
delinquency hearings,' it has not extended the same
protections to juveniles who face an equal loss of liberty
through civil commitment. Frequently the only procedural
protections minors can rely on are those contained in state
voluntary commitment statutes, many of which allow commit-
ment at the parent's request so long as the admitting physi-
cian, often a financially interested party in the private hospital
context, agrees.'
This Note examines New York's voluntary and involuntary
commitment statutes as applied to children. Part I sets forth
the history and development of civil commitment laws in gen-
eral, as well as federal case law establishing the minimum due
process protections that commitment statutes must contain.
Part II examines the New York Mental Hygiene Law, partic-
ularly section 9.13 governing voluntary civil commitment, and
section 9.27 governing involuntary civil commitment, and its
application to minors. This Part also analyzes the problems
and abuses associated with the application of these and similar
state commitment statutes. Part III proposes changes to New
York Mental Hygiene Law section 9.13 to address the problem
of unnecessary and wrongful commitment and retention of
children that may result from the standard for voluntary com-
mitment mandated by this statute, and proposes a new volun-
tary commitment statute that affords children the due process
protections required for involuntary admission.
I. HISTORY OF CIVIL COmMI1TMENT AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE
DUE PROCESS STANDARDS
A. Historical Development
Prior to the 1830s, few hospitals existed in the United
States for treatment of either the physically or mentally ill.1"
extent that further treatment was required. Jones, supra note 5, at 140.
a See In re Wmship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 US. 1 (1967); see
also infra notes 53-66 and accompanying text
' See infra notes 91-105 and accompanying text.
10 PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ALMOST A REVOLUTION: ME.NTAL HEALTH LAw AND THE
LIiMrS OF CHANGE 18 (1994). "In May 1751 ... the Pennsylvania Assembly au-
168919961
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Existing hospitals generally made no distinction between ad-
missions of mentally and physically ill patients.1 Private hos-
pitals were not regulated by the state and were free to formu-
late their own admission policies, which often consisted merely
of certification for admission by an attending physician and a
guarantee of payment by a relative or friend. 2 Due to the
scarcity of hospitals, many mentally ill patients were confined
to prisons or almshouses under deplorable conditions. 3
Toward the middle of the nineteenth century, reformers
campaigned for more humane treatment of the mentally ill. 4
Largely as a result of this era of reform, "states began to as-
sume responsibility for the care of the indigent mentally ill"
and established state-run asylums." However, from the mid-
dle of the eighteenth century until the 1950s, commitment of
patients to these hospitals often was achieved with little for-
mality. "The request of a friend or relative-or perhaps even
an enemy-to a member of the hospital staff for an order of ad-
mission would often suffice. The staff member might then
hastily scribble a few words on a scrap of paper, and sign his
name, and the procedure would be completed." 6
thorized the establishment of a general hospital to cure the mentally disabled as
well as the sick poor. Certification by one physician was required for commitment.
In 1773, Virginia established its first hospital devoted exclusively to the [treatment
ofl the mentally disabled. It remained the only one of its kind until 1824 ...
EDWARD B. BEIS, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW 4 (1984).
" APPELBAUM, supra note 10, at 18.
12 APPELBAUM, supra note 10, at 18-19.
13 APPELBAUM, supra note 10, at 19.
14 APPELBAUM, supra note 10, at 19. Dorathea Lynde Dix and Mrs. E.P.W.
Packard were two such advocates who were instrumental in the reform movement.
BEIS, supra note 10, at 15. Dix spent much of the 1840s and 1850s documenting
the deplorable conditions under which the mentally ill were kept. APPELBAUM,
supra note 10, at 19. As a result of her work, 32 mental hospitals were estab-
lished in the U.S. and abroad. BEIS, supra note 10, at 15. Packard was committed
to a hospital by her husband under a statute that allowed "married women and
infants to be admitted [as mental patients] involuntarily upon the request of a
husband or guardian without presentation of evidence that the statutory standard
[for commitment] had been met." She was hospitalized for three years. BEIS, supra
note 10, at 5.
16 APPELBAUM, supra note 10, at 19.
16 SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 22
(1985) (citing A. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THEIR
CARE AND TREATMENT FROM COLONIAL TIMES 419-20 (1949)) (noting that a commit-
ment standard proposed in a 1952 model statute for the hospitalization of the
mentally ill suggested commitment for those "in need of care or treatment and
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Although state care of the mentally ill imposed some exter-
nal control on commitment procedures, the sole requirement
for commitment was that the person sought to be admitted "be
in need of or likely to benefit from treatment."7 This require-
ment formed the basis for some states' admission standards
well into this century. 8 It was assumed that all patients were
involuntarily committed because their faculties were so im-
paired that they could not request care for themselves.'
The state's power to commit a person involuntarily may be
based on either of two doctrines: the state's parens patriae
power, or its police power. The former, literally translated "the
father of the country," allows and obligates the state to protect
those who are unable to protect themselves: the mentally in-
firm, elderly or unsupervised minority." As a threshold mat-
ter, a person's decisional incompetence is required to invoke
the parens patriae authority since "a competent individual's
refusal to seek treatment is 'strictly a private concern and
beyond reach of all governmental power."' ' The exercise of
the parens patriae power must be in the best interest of the
ward, consisting of what he or she would have done if they
could choose for themselves.' Invocation of this power re-
quires a balance between "the basic liberty interest of the
ward, his expressed wishes, and the level of care and treat-
ment the state is able to provide through its institutions,
counting also the considerable deprivations that may be part of
the institutional treatment regimen."2
3
[who] lack sufficient capacity to evaluate such need responsibly").
17 APPELBAUM, supra note 10, at 20; see BEIS, supra note 10, at 6 (quoting
NICHOLAS N. KITTRIE, THE RIGHT To BE DIFFERENT 70 (1971)).
is APPELBAUM, supra note 10, at 20.
"9 APPELBAUM, supra note 10, at 20.
"See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 16, at 24; BARRY NURCOMBE & DAVID F.
PARTLrTT, CHLD MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW11 33 (1994); BARBARA A. WEINER
& ROBERT M. WErSTEIN, LEGAL ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE 47 (1993).
11 BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 16, at 24 (quoting In re President & Directors of
Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1010, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1964)). As noted above,
decisional incompetence was assumed for the involuntary patient, making commit-
ment a foregone conclusion. BRAKEL, ET AL., supra note 16, at 24.
WEINER & WETTSTEIN, supra note 20, at 47.
BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 16, at 24. In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17-18
(1967), the Supreme Court recognized that the parens patriae power has failed to
fulfill its mandate of acting in the best interests of its wards in the context of the
juvenile justice system. See infra notes 56-73 and accompanying text.
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While parens patriae focuses on the protection of the
individual's well being, the focus of a state's police power is on
protecting the general public from the incompetent individu-
al.' For the mentally disabled person who has committed no
crime, the threshold requirement for invocation of the police
power to commit him or her is the "individual's diminished
capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law
or to the limits of social tolerance and his inability to appreci-
ate the deterrent force of the law."25
For nearly a century after the initial reforms of the 1800s,
changes in the law of civil commitment focused almost exclu-
sively on the commitment procedure itself, rather than on the
criteria for hospitalization.6 Judicial, trial-like procedures
were advocated and employed in many states, allowing a men-
tally ill person to object to confinement and to receive a hear-
ing in which a jury made the ultimate commitment decision."
In the past century, changes to commitment procedures have
followed a cycle of reform and backlash, depending on what
type of abuse caught the public eye.28 When patients were
found to have been wrongfully committed, procedural safe-
guards were strengthened. When patients deserving treatment
were denied admission to hospitals due to procedural obstacles,
the procedural protections were removed. 9
During the Progressive era, and again between the 1930s
and 1950s, concern over the difficulty in obtaining prompt
treatment resulted in emergency commitment procedures that
bypassed judicial review and relaxed procedural safeguards,
such as the requirements of notice and the patient's presence
at commitment proceedings. ° States that retained trial-like
proceedings deferred to the presiding judge's discretion con-
cerning whether to inform the patient of his or her commit-
ment hearing."1
2, BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 16, at 24; see Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp.
1078, 1084 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
25 BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 16, at 24.
26 APPELBAUM, supra note 10, at 20.
27 APPELBAUM, supra note 10, at 20.
28 See APPELBAUM, supra note 10, at 21; BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 16, at 22-
23.
29 APPELBAUM, supra note 10, at 21.
30 APPELBAUM, supra note 10, at 21; BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 16, at 22.
31 APPELBAUM, supra note 10, at 21.
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In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a counter trend devel-
oped due to a growing interest in the rights of mental patients
and reform efforts of public interest and Legal Aid lawyers.'
Spurring this movement was the belief that states had gone
too far in the exercise of their parens patriae and police pow-
ers.'s In response, states revised their commitment laws to af-
ford greater procedural protections and narrowed the criteria
for identifying patients as committable.' It was also at this
time that the Supreme Court began to hear due process chal-
lenges to civil commitment laws.
B. Due Process for Adult Mental Patients
While Civil commitment statutes have been in existence
since states first became involved in caring for the mentally ill,
until recently relatively little Supreme Court case law devel-
oped concerning these statutes. In a series of cases beginning
in the late 1960s, the Supreme Court began to apply due pro-
cess protections to civil commitment, as well as to proceedings
and contexts analogous to civil commitment.' In 1972, the
Court characterized civil commitment as "such a massive cur-
tailment of liberty" that due process protections must apply.3s
' BEIS, supra note 10, at 6. Such lawsuits became possible as the result of the
Supreme Court's use of procedural due process analysis in individual rights cases
such as Brown v. Board of Education and the revival of § 1983 as a basis for civil
actions. APPELBUAM, supra note 10, at 23.
"See BRAKEL ET AL, supra note 16, at 26; NURCOMBE & PAM=, supra
note 20, at 43.
', BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 16, at 26. In 1967, the California legislature
passed the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act which gave detailed procedural protections
to involuntary adult patients, and required a finding of dangerousness to self or
others in order for involuntary commitment to be ordered.
' See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (juvenile delinquency proceed-
ings); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (same).
" Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972). In Humphrey, a sex offender
who had been convicted under the W-isconsin Sex Crimes Act challenged the provi-
sion of that statute that allowed continued commitment of convicted sex offenders
beyond the maximum term of their criminal sentence. The Court analogized such
continued commitment to involuntary civil commitment under the Wisconsin Men-
tal Health Act, which required a finding "that the defendant is mentally ill and
treatable .. . [and a] legal judgment that his potential for doing harm, to himself
or to others, is great enough to justify such a massive curtailment of liberty." Id.
19961 1693
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Early federal court cases extended due process protections
to prisoners who were found to be mentally ill or sexually
deviant and thus requiring transfer to, or confinement in, state
mental institutions." In Sprecht v. Patterson, Francis Sprecht
had been convicted under a Colorado criminal statute, which
carried a maximum sentence of ten years, but sentenced under
the Colorado Sex Offenders Act, which permitted an indetermi-
nate sentence.38 The Supreme Court held that the Sex Offend-
ers Act, which allowed for a proceeding to determine if the
offender was an habitual offender or mentally ill, did not com-
port with due process because it did not provide "the full pano-
ply of the relevant protections which due process guarantees in
state criminal proceedings."39
Subsequent cases have defined the scope of the due pro-
cess protections afforded involuntary adult patients. In 1972, a
Wisconsin district court issued a sweeping and influential
opinion on the validity of civil commitment in Lessard v.
Schmidt. ° In that case, Alberta Lessard was detained in a
Milwaukee mental hospital for nearly a month against her will
under the Wisconsin involuntary commitment statute, which
provided none of the traditional due process protections.4 The
Wisconsin district court rejected the parens patriae justifica-
tion for the relaxed standards of civil commitment, stating that
the power of the state to deprive a person of fundamental lib-
erty must be "tempered with stringent procedural safe-
guards,"42 and "unless constitutionally prescribed procedural
due process requirements for involuntary commitment are met,
" See, e.g., Sprecht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967); Baxtrom v. Herold, 383
U.S. 107 (1966) (holding that prisoner nearing end of criminal sentence entitled to
same jury review on question of mental illness as others before committed under
state statute).
3' Sprecht, 386 U.S. at 609-10.
Id. (quoting Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302, 312 (3rd Cir. 1966)).
349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
41 The Wisconsin statute allowed for involuntary civil commitment for up to
145 days without a hearing on the necessity of detention, did not require that
notice of hearings be given to involuntary patients, failed to provide for a right to
counsel or the appointment of counsel at a meaningful time, and did not allow
counsel to be present at psychiatric interviews. Similarly, the statute did not re-
quire the exclusion of hearsay evidence or a finding beyond a reasonable doubt
that the person be in need of such commitment. In fact, the statute did not de-
scribe any burden of proof, reasonable doubt or otherwise. Id. at 1090.
42 Id. at 1084.
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no person should be subjected to 'treatment' against his
will." s The court extended the procedural safeguards required
in criminal proceedings to civil commitment, since commitment
can have "enormous and devastating effects on the civil rights
of the individual," even more so than criminal confinement.44
The court reasoned that since "the interests in avoiding civil
commitment are at least as high as those of persons accused of
criminal offenses.... [t]he resulting burden on the state to
justify civil commitment must be correspondingly high." In
order to save the statute from unconstitutionality, the Lessard
court interpreted the statutory standard, that the prospective
patient be "mentally ill or infirm or deficient and.., a proper
subject for custody and treatment," as requiring a finding that
if the person was not confined, he or she would do immediate
harm to self or others.46
43 Id. at 1087.
" Id. at 1089. One of the effects described by the court, aside from the depri-
vation of personal liberty, was that under Wisconsin law, involuntary hospitaliza-
tion raised a rebuttable presumption of incompetence so long as the person is
under the jurisdiction of the hospital authorities. This impaired the committed
person's right to enter into contracts, to sue or be sued, to obtain certain licenses
and engage in certain professions, to vote, drive a car, sit on juries, and to enter
into marriage contracts. The court also noted that involuntary hospitalization car-
ried with it a heavy stigma that could impair the patient's functioning outside of
the institution and his or her ability to procure employment. Also, the court cited
recent studies indicating that mental patients were several times more likely to
die in Wisconsin state institutions, possibly because the doctor to patient ratio was
so high. In short, the court found that "adjudication of mental illness in Wisconsin
carries with it a loss of basic civil rights and loss of future opportunities.' Id. at
1090.
"Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1090. The court found those sections of the statute
that allowed involuntary commitment for up to 145 days without a hearing or no-
tice to the patient facially unconstitutional. Instead, the court required notice con-
sisting of the time, date and place of the commitment hearing, the basis for deten-
tion, the name of the examining physicians and those who may testify and the
substance of their proposed testimony, as well as notification of the right to a jury
trial. Id.
4 Id. at 1093. The court also held that the state bore the burden of proving
dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence of a recent overt act, at-
tempt or threat to do substantial harm to oneself or another. Id. at 1093-95. Simi-
larly, the court held that the right to counsel and the fifth amendment protection
against self-incrimination applied in the civil commitment context, and that invol-
untary civil commitment be used only as a last resort. Id. at 1095, 1097, 1101.
The district court relied on the language of Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960), for its conclusion that commitment should only be used as a last resort. In
Shelton, the Supreme Court stated that "even though the governmental purpose be
legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly
1996] 1695
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Although the Supreme Court has declined to require all of
the due process protection required by the Lessard court, it has
repeatedly recognized that civil commitment for any purpose
constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires
due process protection,47 and has established a minimum due
process requirement in civil commitment proceedings. In
O'Connor v. Donaldson, the Court held that a finding of mental
illness alone is insufficient to justify involuntary civil confine-
ment, and that "a State cannot constitutionally confine without
more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving in
freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible
family members or friends."48
The scope of the necessary procedural safeguards was
defined by the Court in Vitek v. Jones.49 In addressing the is-
sue of what due process procedures are required to transfer a
convict from a prison to a mental hospital under a Nebraska
state statute, the Court recognized that "[wiere an ordinary
citizen to be subjected to involuntar[y] ... [commitment], it is
undeniable that protected liberty interests would be unconsti-
tutionally infringed upon absent compliance with the proce-
dures required by the Due Process Clause."" The plurality
agreed that the constitutionally required procedures include:
(a) notice given sufficiently in advance of the hearing to give
stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.
The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic
means for achieving the same basic purpose." Id. at 488.
" See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405
U.S. 504, 509-10 (1967); Sprecht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 609-11 (1967).
" 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975). O'Connor had been committed indefinitely to a
Florida mental hospital by his father. Although he was not dangerous and appar-
ently was capable of gaining employment outside of the institution, he remained in
custody for fifteen years. The treatment he received during this period consisted
mostly of "milieu therapy," a euphemism for confinement in the "milieu" of the
hospital. Id. at 568.
"9 445 U.S. 480 (1980). In Vitek, Jones, a convicted felon in a Nebraska state
prison, challenged his transfer to a state mental hospital under a statute allowing
such transfers upon a finding that the prisoner suffers from a mental illness that
cannot be treated appropriately in the prison. The diagnosis of a mental illness
was left to either a physician or psychologist designated by the Director of Correc-
tional Services. The Court held that due to the stigma attached to commitment,
and the necessary change in treatment such a transfer entailed, the statute creat-
ed a liberty interest in not being designated mentally ill that could not be abro-
gated absent procedural due process. Id. at 493-94.
'0 Id. at 492.
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the prisoner time to prepare; (b) notice of the evidence being
relied on to effect the transfer; (c) the opportunity to be heard,
to present testimony and confront witnesses; and (d) the right
to assistance.5' While the Court held that these due process
protections apply in force to adults, later cases indicate that
children may be committed under statutes containing signifi-
cantly less procedural protection. 2
C. Due Process for Children
While the Supreme Court has recognized that "[mlinors, as
well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess
constitutional rights,"' it has held that these protections do
not necessarily apply with equal force to children and adults.
The rights of children have been limited by the Court's recogni-
tion of the interests of parents and the state in the upbringing
and welfare of children.' The state's interest has been given
force through the application of the parens patriae doctrine,
which gives the state the power to exercise more control over
the conduct of children than that of adults since children are
perceived to be more susceptible to harm and less able to make
sound judgments." Parents' interests have been given force
through the Court's elevation of parental control over children
to constitutional status." Underlying the Supreme Court cas-
" Id. at 494. The plurality could not agree that the prisoner was constitution-
ally entitled to the assistance of an attorney, with Justice Powell arguing that
'[dlue process merely requires that the State provide an inmate with qualified and
independent assistance." Id. at 500. Contrary to the Lessard court, the Supreme
Court has held that the evidentiary standard to be used in commitment proceed-
ings is proof by clear and convincing evidence. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,
430-31 (1979).
52 See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
Carey v. Population Serv. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 692 (1977) (citing Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (contraception)); see Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (First Amendment rights
of minors).
" See, e.g., Carey, 431 U.S. at 692 (citing Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74); Tinher,
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
" See, eg., Parham, 442 U.S. at 602 (children lack the maturity, experience
and capacity to make difficult decisions); Carey, 431 US. at 692; Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 638-39 (1968) (state has power to adjust definition of obsceni-
ty as applied to minors); Prince v. Massachusetts., 321 U.S. 158, 168-70 (1944)
(state power to control conduct of children is broader than power to control con-
duct of adults).
5 See, eg., WVsconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sis-
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es defining parental autonomy and the rights of parents to
control the upbringing of their children is a fundamental belief
in the sanctity of the family as a unit, with parental control of
children as a significant element of the liberty of being a par-
ent.57 Rather than enunciating a single test for determining
the scope of children's constitutional rights, the Court has en-
gaged in a case-by-case balancing of the interests of the parent,
child and the state."8
While the Supreme Court has given credence to the parens
patriae role of the state in some contexts, it has also noted the
shortcomings of this approach. Where it has perceived that the
state has failed in its parens patriae role, the Court has ex-
tended to minors those due process protections afforded adults.
One such context is the juvenile justice system.59
In the juvenile justice system, states utilized their parens
patriae authority to justify treating minors outside of the tradi-
tional criminal justice system; acting in loco parentis to pro-
vide compassionate guidance, rather than to punish their juve-
nile wards."0 Because of this fundamental difference in pur-
pose, juvenile court proceedings were viewed as civil, rather
than criminal, and therefore the rules of criminal procedure
were seen as inapplicable.6' However, instead of treating
juveniles more compassionately, the juvenile justice system
often treated children arbitrarily and allowed judges to impose
their own brand of justice and to sentence children more
harshly than they could adults.62
As the Court stated in In re Gault, "The powers of the Star
Chamber were a trifle in comparison with those of our juvenile
courts."6" In Gault, fifteen-year-old Francis Gault was found
ters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
" See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 231-32 ("The history and culture of Western civiliza-
tion reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing
of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their chil-
dren is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.").
" This balancing test has caused varying results, with the child's interests
winning out over those of the parent, and vice versa, in different contexts. See,
e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Pierce,
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
" Gault, 387 U.S at 17-19.
60 Id. at 15.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 19.
' Id. at 18 (quoting DEAN POUND, YOUNG, SOCIAL TREATMENT IN PROBATION
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guilty of making a lewd phone call under the Arizona Juvenile
Code. He was sentenced to a state juvenile institution for the
remainder of his minority, six years.' Under Arizona law, the
maximum sentence for an adult for the same offense was a
fifty dollar fine or a sentence of two months in prison.'
Because of the potential for such disproportionately harsh
treatment and other failures of the state in its parens patriae
role in the juvenile justice context,' the Court held that juve-
nile delinquency hearings "must measure up to the essentials
of due process,"' noting that the "observance of due process
standards ... will not compel the States to abandon or dis-
place any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile process. '
The Court extended to minors those due process protections
afforded adults, noting that the history of juvenile court has
"demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently
motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and
procedure.'
D. Due Process for Minors in the Civil Commitment Context
While the involuntary commitment of adults has been
categorized as a "massive curtailment of liberty"70 implicating
AND DELINQUENCY at xxvii (1937)).
" Gault, 387 U.S. at 29.
Id. at 8-9, 20.
See iE at 21-23 (discussing rising juvenile crime rate, recidivism and failure
of juvenile justice system to rehabilitate juvenile offenders).
' Id at 30-31 (citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 542 (1966)).
Id at 21.
69 Gcault, 387 U.S. at 17-18. The Gault Court held that due process for juve-
niles included: adequate notice of the charges against the child; that the notice set
forth the charges in writing and with particularity, that notice be given at the
earliest practicable time and sufficiently in advance of court proceedings that a
reasonable opportunity to prepare is afforded. A right to counsel was also held as
essential to any proceeding that could result in a loss of liberty for a term of
years, as well as the right to confrontation of witnesses. Id. at 55-56. Similarly,
the Court held that the availability of the fifth amendment right against self-in-
crimination does "not turn on the type of proceeding in which its protection is in-
volved, but upon the nature of the statement or admission and the exposure which
it invites." Id at 49. Children, unlike hardened adults, are particularly vulnerable
in situations where coercion or intimidation is likely, and 'the constitutional privi-
lege against self-incrimination is applicable in the case of juveniles as it is with
respect to adults." Id. at 55; see In re Winship, 397 US. 358 (1970) (minors enti-
tled to reasonable doubt standard in juvenile delinquency proceedings).
"0 Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 508 (1972).
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due process protections, children have not been afforded the
same protections. Although the Supreme Court explicitly recog-
nized the failures of the juvenile justice system and the parens
patriae doctrine it was built on, and consequently extended
due process protections to minors in this context, it has failed
to accord the same degree of protection to minors committed to
mental institutions, even when parents or state custodial agen-
cies may volunteer children for commitment.1 The reasons for
this disparity can be explained by the Court's analysis of
children's rights in different contexts. The Court's approach
has been to balance the interests of the child against those of
both the parents and the state in order to achieve the best
public policy solution, which has lead to varying results de-
pending on the interests involved.72
1. Lower Courts
Before the Supreme Court addressed the issue, several
state and lower federal courts heard due process challenges to
voluntary admission statutes, many of them passed in the late
1950s and 1960s, that permitted parents to commit their chil-
dren without a court hearing." Typically these statutes al-
lowed parents to commit their children simply by petition or
application for admission with none of the legal formalities
afforded adults, such as notice, counsel, witnesses or burden of
proof.74 The justification for the passage of such procedurally
lax laws was the pro-family rationale that parents are best
able to judge that their child is mentally ill.75 Additionally,
these laws were based on the therapeutic rationales that ad-
versarial proceedings, with the parent on one side and the
child on the other, would be detrimental to the family and the
" See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Secretary of Public Welfare of Pa.
v. Institutionalized Juveniles, 442 U.S. 640 (1979); see also infra notes 88-114 and
accompanying text.
72 Compare Parham, 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (finding parental interests paramount
in civil commitment context) with Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (upholding high school student's first amendment rights)
and Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (upholding minors' right
to contraception).
73 BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 16, at 43-44.
74 BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 16, at 44.
72 BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 16, at 44.
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parent-child relationship, and that voluntary admissions are
preferred because they evidence a desire on the part of the
patient to get better.76
Many of the lower courts that addressed challenges on
behalf of minors to such voluntary admission statutes found
unconstitutional those statutes that did not afford minors
all-or nearly all--of the due process protections.' In one
such challenge, Melville v. Sabbatino," a Connecticut state
court analogized civil commitment of minors to juvenile delin-
quency hearings. The court struck down Connecticut's volun-
tary commitment statute under the same reasoning employed
by the Supreme Court in Gault,9 that deprivation of liber-
ty-even that of a minor-requires due process."
Similarly, in Saville v. Treadway,"1 a case involving the
commitment of mentally retarded minors, a federal district
court found it "absolutely essential that such confinement be
preceded by adequate procedural safeguards" and not left
wholly to the discretion of parents.' In Bartley v. Kremens,s
a class action brought in a Pennsylvania district court on be-
half of voluntarily committed minors, the few procedural
protections afforded by the state voluntary commitment statute
were found inadequate. While the court noted that parents
" BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 16, at 44. Admission under such statutes is rare-
ly completely voluntary. Rather, "the hallmark of voluntary admission is that gen-
erally the hospital staff has the authority to decide when actual release will occur
within legislatively mandated time frames." WEINER & WETrSFEIN, supra note 20,
at 44; see John P. Panneton, Children Commitment and Consent: A Constitutional
Crisis, 10 FAMILY L.Q., 295, 303-04 (1977) (noting that the therapeutic rationale
makes no sense when the patient is coerced into a facility and that such a "volun-
tary" admission does not evidence a desire on the part of the patient to seek
help).
' See, e.g., Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated
and remanded, 431 U.S. 119 (1977); Saville v. Treadway, 404 F. Supp. 430 (M.D.
Tenn. 1974) (mentally retarded minors); Dixon v. Attorney General of the Com-
monwealth of Pa., 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971); Melville v. Sabbatino, 313
A.2d 886, 888 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1973).
Melville, 313 A.2d at 888.
387 U.S. 1 (1967).
Melville, 313 A.2d at 888.
" 404 F. Supp. 430 (M.D. Tenn. 1974).
Id. at 432. Although Saville was a case involving mentally retarded minors,
the courts analysis is equally applicable to the commitment of minors to mental
institutions.




have traditionally been afforded autonomy in making decisions
for their children, it also recognized that the interests of par-
ents (and those standing in loco parentis) may be in conflict
with the interests of the child, thus increasing the risk of
wrongful commitment.' Due to this risk, the court found that
procedural safeguards, including a probable cause hearing,
postcommitment hearings, notice, counsel and a finding of
need for treatment by a standard of clear and convincing proof,
were necessary for such a statute to pass constitutional mus-
ter.8 '
2. Supreme Court
In 1979, a divided Supreme Court finally addressed the
issue of voluntary commitment statutes in Parham v. J.R., a
class action suit challenging the constitutionality of Georgia's
procedures for voluntary commitment of children.86 Parham
established the minimum due process protections required for
the voluntary admission of minors to state mental institutions,
both for children committed by their parents or guardians and
for those committed as wards of the state.87 As with many
voluntary commitment statutes, the challenged state law al-
lowed children to be committed upon application of a parent or
guardian, regardless of the child's wishes, and request for
discharge could be made only by the admitting adult or the
superintendent of the facility." Children found by the super-
' Id. at 1047-48.
85 Id. at 1053. The district court found Justice Harlan's concurrence in In re
Winship controlling on the issue of standard of proof. Justice Harlan argued that
the standard of proof is determined by the comparative social costs of an errone-
ous finding of fact. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370-71 (1969). Since the social
cost of erroneously committing a child is high, and the cost of wrongly finding
commitment unnecessary is low, a higher standard is appropriate. Bartley, 402 F.
Supp. at 1051-52.
86 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). Parham was consolidated with a second
case, Secretary of Public Welfare v. Institutionalized Juveniles, 442 U.S. 640
(1979), which was decided on the same bases as Parham and handed down the
same day.
87 Parham, 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.13 (McKinney 1996) (allowing volun-
tary admission of children by parents, but, unlike the Georgia statute at issue in
Parham, also allowing children to request their own release). Voluntary admissions
were initially seen as beneficial since they did not put the patient in an adversary
relationship with his or her family. Also, it was thought that voluntary patients
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intendent to show signs of mental illness and to be suitable for
treatment could be admitted.s The statute required that re-
tention of the child be subject to periodic review, and that the
superintendent release any child found to have sufficiently
recovered.'
To determine what procedures minors are constitutionally
entitled to when facing commitment, the Court employed the
balancing test articulated in Matthews v. Eldrige,1 weighing
the private interest affected; the risk of erroneous deprivation
through the procedures used and the probable value of addi-
tional safeguards; as well as the governments interests, in-
cluding fiscal and administrative burdens, that additional or
substitute procedures would entail.' The Court recognized
that children, like adults, have undisputed and "substan-
are better candidates for recovery since they have shown a desire to "get better,"
and voluntary admissions allow treatment in the early stages of a disease before
the statutory requirements for involuntary admission have been met. However,
some have questioned the voluntariness of such commitments for children as well
as adults. Patients may be pressured into voluntary commitment with the threat
of involuntary proceedings, or through their lack of information. Charles W. Ellis,
Volunteering Children: Parental Commitment of Minors to Mental Institutions, 62
CAL. L. REV. 840, 846-48 (1974); see BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 16, at 179, stating
in reference to adult admission:
A study of voluntary admissions ... found that the majority of persons
admitted under the [Illinois] procedure were already in some form of
official custody when they "decided" to enter the mental hospital and that
many were pressured by the threat of less advantageous alternatives to
agree to the suggestion to sign themselves in. In some 40% of the cases,
the admittees were reportedly brought to the hospital by the police, a
circumstance that suggests that the alternative to voluntary admission
would have been involuntary emergency commitment or placement in jail
on a disorderly conduct charge or the like.
"Parham, 442 U.S. at 588 n.3. The trend in recent years has been toward
lowering the age at which patients may voluntarily commit themselves, rather
than being voluntarily committed by their parents or guardians. Many states allow
children as young as 16 to voluntarily commit themselves. See BRAIM.L Er AL.,
supra note 16, at 190-201 (comparing state voluntary admission statutes); ILL
ANN. STAT. ch. 91-1/2, SI 3-401 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983). However, children under
the statutorily defined age may still be voluntarily committed upon the application
of a parent or guardian.
' Parham, 442 U.S. at 591. An affirmative duty also existed under the Geor-
gia statute to release, at the parent or guardian's request, any child hospitalized
for more than five days.
" 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976).
SZ Parham, 442 U.S. at 599-600. While the Court stated that it conducted a
balancing test, its analysis did not explore any procedural safeguard other than
those already required by the Georgia statute. Id.
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tial ... liberty interest[s] in not being confined unnecessarily
for medical treatment," 3 and that commitment to a mental
health facility is a "massive curtailment of liberty" that trig-
gers constitutional due process protection.' Despite these con-
siderations, the Court held the state procedures constitutional-
ly sufficient,95 finding that the minimum statutory protections
must include an inquiry by a neutral factfinder into the child's
background and a determination that the child meets the stat-
utory conditions for commitment."5 Similarly, in order for a
commitment statute to be constitutionally sound, it must pro-
vide the doctor or mental health professional making the deci-
sion to admit a child with the authority to refuse admission,"
and must require periodic review of the need for continuing
commitment of the child by a neutral factfinder In short,
the Court concluded that sufficient due process protections in-
here in any statutory scheme that allows commitment where
the parents have requested commitment of the child and a
single doctor or mental health professional agrees with the
parent's request.99
The Court found that an adversarial proceeding, in which
an advocate for the child can challenge the proposed commit-
ment, was undesirable and not constitutionally required since
such proceedings would impose severe costs on the state and
on other mental patients whose care would be degraded by the
need for doctors to attend commitment proceedings rather than
devoting themselves to patient care.00 Adversarial admission
Id. at 600.
Id. (quoting Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972)).
'7 Id. at 606-07.
96 Id.
' Parham, 442 U.S. at 607.
98 Id. at 585, 607.
" Some commentators have noted that where "the only limitation on parental
discretion [to commit a child] is the concurrence by the committing authority ...
these officials frequently fail to exercise independent judgment . .. land] generally
defer to the wishes of the parent." Ellis, supra note 88, at 850. Also, the environ-
ment in which a child is interviewed by a mental health professional and the
prospect of commitment may elicit abnormal behavior from the child that is misin-
terpreted as grounds for admission to a hospital. BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 16, at
178.
" Parham, 442 U.S. at 605-06. However, some scholars and mental health pro-
fessionals have noted that admission interviews are often perfunctory, with few
institutions capable of expending the resources to conduct extensive background
checks and investigations. Ellis, supra note 88, at 865-66. Similarly, experiments
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hearings were also found by the Court not to reduce sufficient-
ly the risk of erroneous commitment to justify their costs.'0 '
Additionally, adversarial hearings could put medical decisions
in the hands of judges and judicial factfinders who are ill
equipped to make such decisions, could possibly exacerbate a
child's emotional problems by pitting the child against the
family he or she may have to return to in the near future, or
discourage families from seeking treatment altogether.' 2
have been conducted to test the efficacy and accuracy of such admission proce-
dures. In one such experiment healthy individuals who presented themselves at
various psychiatric hospitals complaining of hearing a voice saying "empty" or
"thud" were admitted to these hospitals and diagnosed as schizophrenic or manic
depressive. Ellis, supra note 88, at 865-66. Conversely, an experiment in which
hospital staffs were warned to watch out for such 'pseudo-patients" identified 41
such patients out of 193 patients evaluated although no such pseudo-patients were
presented for admission. Ellis, supra note 88, at 865-66. Also, hospital personnel
may not easily recognize when a child has been improperly committed or may be
reluctant to release a child when there is no viable option for placement in the
community. Institutionalization itself may induce abnormal behavior or cause the
patient to take on the role of "patient." Similarly, 'the impersonal nature of the
day-to-day hospital operation makes immediate identification [of a patient as im-
properly committed] unlikely." Ellis, supra note 88, at 868. Even vigorous protests
against commitment may be viewed as a sign of illness. For those children admit-
ted and later discovered to be healthy, or not warranting in-patient treatment, it
cannot be said that no emotional damage has been done to them as a result of
their incarceration. Ellis, supra note 88, at 868-69.
Parham, 442 U.S. at 605.
Id. at 606-13. The Court's reasoning regarding the need for adversarial hear-
ings and their effect on children has been strongly criticized. See Michael L.
Perlin, An Invitation to the Dance: An Empirical Response to Chief Justice Warren
Burger's 'time consuming procedural minuet" Theory in Parham v. JR., 9 BULLE-
TIN OF THE AD mCAN ACADEMY OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW, 149 (1981). Perlin
criticizes Justice Burger's argument that adversarial proceedings and other proce-
dural safeguards constitute "time consuming procedural minuets" and are unneces-
sary. Perlin, a mental health professional, noted that the argument against impos-
ing procedural obstacles to admission 'simultaneously assumes that (1) persons at
risk are genuinely mentally ill, (2) they are in need of psychiatric assistance, (3)
such psychiatric assistance is available at the institution to which the juveniles
are being committed." Id. at 151. Perlin also points out that the authority cited by
the Court to support its argument that adversarial proceedings are unnecessary,
Dale A. Albers et al., Involuntary Hospitalization and Psychiatric Testimony: The
Fallibility of the Doctrine of Immaculate Perception, 6 CAP. U. L REV. 11 (1976),
actually discusses the inadequate job counsel usually perform at commitment hear-
ings and advocates a more active role on the part of counsel. Perlin, supra, at
152. Similarly, the Court relied heavily on the American Psychiatric Association's
amicus curiae brief for the proposition that adversarial hearings will be harmful to
the child. However, the articles cited in that brief only speak to the effect of hos-
pitalization on the parent, while other amicus briefs, which the Court disregarded,
found such hearings to be beneficial to the therapeutic process. Perlin, supra, at
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The fear that without an adversarial proceeding children
could be "railroaded" into institutions was discounted since any
such "charade" by parents would eventually be discovered by
mental health professionals trained to evaluate human behav-
ior.103 Similarly, the Parham Court found that state health
professionals have no vested interest in committing a healthy
child who will only take up resources that could be better used
on truly mentally ill patients.0 4
Underlying the Parham Court's analysis is the premise
articulated in such cases as Wisconsin v. Yoder"0 5 and Meyer
v. Nebraska,l"' that the autonomy of parents in making deci-
sions for their children is such an integral part of western
history and tradition that the interests of parents are
paramount.0 7 Although the Court acknowledged, as lower
courts had previously, that the interests of parents and chil-
dren do not necessarily coincide and that parents may at times
act contrary to the best interests of the child,' it neverthe-
less found the risk of erroneous commitment at the hands of
parents insufficient to require additional procedural safe-
guards.' 9 Rather, the Court reasoned that the historical con-
ception of the family as "a unit with broad parental authority
over minor children""0 allowed parents to retain the domi-
nant role in the decision to commit a child, particularly since
children are, in the Court's view, "simply... not able to make
sound judgments concerning [such] decisions."1
154-56.
10- Parham, 442 U.S. at 611.
1'0 Id. at 604-05.
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
100 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
1 See Parham, 442 U.S. at 602.
100 Id. at 603-04; see Saville v. Treadway, 404 F. Supp. 430, 432 (M.D. Tenn.
1974) (finding it essential that due process protections be applied to commitment
hearings for retarded children given the potential for conflict between interests of
parent and child); New York State Ass'n. for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357
F. Supp. 752, 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (recognizing the possibility of a fundamental
conflict between interests of parent and child).
109 Parham, 442 U.S. at 603-04.
10 Id. at 602.
110 Id. at 604. But see In re Long, 214 S.E.2d 626 (N.C. 1975) (holding that
tradition of parental autonomy and concerns about ability of minors to make deci-
sions cannot override child's liberty interest in not being committed to a state
institution).
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By emphasizing the interests of parents and the western
cultural tradition of parental autonomy in making decisions
regarding children, the Court collapsed the interests of the
child into those of the parent, rather than independently as-
sessing whether the child has a protectable interest in being
free from bodily restraint. The Court's analysis led it to con-
clude that the "natural bonds of affection" will cause parents to
act in the best interests of the child, despite acknowledging
that some parents do, in fact, act contrary to these inter-
ests." The assumption that parents will act in the best in-
terests of the child is also evident in state civil commitment
statutes that rely on the involvement of family and friends to
prevent wrongful commitments.
H. NEW YORK'S MENTAL HYGIENE LAW
A. Voluntary Admission Procedures
New York's civil commitment statutes are among those that
rely on familial involvement to prevent wrongful commitments.
Under New York Mental Hygiene Law section 9.13, any suit-
able person in need of care and treatment may be voluntarily
admitted to any mental hospital upon written application."
" Parham, 442 U.S. at 602. In Parham, Justice Brennan concurred in part
and dissented in part, noting that 'Ic]onstitutional rights do not mature and come
into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Mi-
nors as well as adults are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional
rights." Id. at 627 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
74 (1976)). Brennan argued that these due process rights confer on the minor a
right to an adversarial proceeding equal to that of an adult, complete with the
right to representation, confrontation, cross examination and the right to offer
evidence. Children may even be entitled to more protection than adults since they
are often committed for longer than adults, are possibly more scarred by the expe-
rience, and are often denied adequate treatment and conditions. Id. at 628
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan argued that the case should be governed by the
rule of Danforth, prohibiting an absolute parental veto over a minors exercise of a
constitutional right, stating that "parental authority and family autonomy cannot
stand as absolute and invariable barriers to the assertion of constitutional rights
by children." Id
in N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.13 (McKinney 1996). A person 'in need of care
and treatment" is defined as "a person who has a mental illness for which in-
patient care and treatment in a hospital is appropriate." Id. § 9.01. To be found
"suitable," a patient must be aware he or she is entering a mental hospital and
must understand the consequences of voluntary commitment, including the possibl-
ity that his or her status as a voluntary patient may be converted to involuntary,
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Children under the age of sixteen may be voluntarily admitted
upon the application of a parent, legal guardian, next of kin or
a person or agency that has care and custody of the child." 4
Admission of children upon the application of parents or cus-
todians are uniformly considered voluntary, even if the child
objects to the admission."' Children over sixteen years old,
but younger than eighteen, may be voluntarily admitted either
upon their own application or by those persons and entities
that may voluntarily admit a younger child.11 6 In short, chil-
dren may be committed on the basis of the application of a
parent, guardian or state agency and the examination of a sin-
gle doctor."'
Upon admission, all voluntary patients, regardless of age,
must immediately be informed of their admission status and of
their rights, including the availability of the Mental Hygiene
Legal Service ("MHLS")."5 The MHLS is a statutorily created
and the rules governing his or her release. Id. § 9.17. This provision seeks to
ensure that the admission is, in fact, voluntary. However, this protection can easi-
ly be undermined since the voluntary patient "may have agreed to hospitalization
because of the threat of involuntary proceedings, family pressure, or exploitation of
his or her lack of information." Ellis, supra note 88, at 846. Some commentators
believe that "truly voluntary hospitalization is virtually nonexistent in public men-
tal institutions in the United States." Ellis, supra note 88, at 846.
114 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.13. Children may be admitted by agencies under
a court order executed pursuant to § 384(a) of the Social Services Law, by a social
service official or agency authorized with care and custody of the child under the
Social Services Law, by the director of the division for youth under § 509 of the
Executive Law, or by a person having custody of the child under the Family Court
Act. Id.
... Id. § 9.13; Telephone Interview with Ramon Perez, Mental Hygiene Legal
Services Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Jan. 18, 1996) [hereinafter Perez Telephone
Interview].
116 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.13. The director of the hospital has the discre-
tion to determine whether children over 16 may be admitted upon their own appli-
cation. Id.
17 Such voluntary admissions of minors can be constitutionally effected only
after an examination by a doctor or mental health care professional. Parham v.
J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979). At least one commentator has noted that where
"the only limitation on parental discretion [to commit a child] is the concurrence
by the committing authority . . . these officials frequently fall to exercise indepen-
dent judgment . .. [and] generally defer to the wishes of the parent." Ellis, supra
note 88, at 850.
n8 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.07. Voluntary patients must be periodically
informed of their rights throughout their in-patient care. Id. § 9.19. Similarly,
MHLS must be informed of any change in a minor patient's admission status and
the patient may seek review of the change in status prior to its effect. Id. § 9.09.
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legal service which is obligated to review the status of patients
and act as a legal advocate for them." The MHLS must be
informed of the admission of all patients under the age of eigh-
teen, and MULS attorneys routinely interview adolescent pa-
tients shortly after admission.'
All voluntary patients may request to be discharged by
giving written notice to the institution's director, and must be
promptly released upon such a request unless there are
grounds to believe that the patient is suitable for involuntary
treatment." If such grounds exist, the hospital may hold the
patient for up to seventy-two hours, during which time the
hospital director must apply for court authorization for invol-
untary retention of the patient.' As a practical matter, chil-
dren admitted on a voluntary basis are never immediately
released. Rather, they must file a "seventy-two hour letter"
requesting a hearing to determine if they may be involuntarily
held.' If such an application is made by the director, then
the patient, MILS and certain persons designated by the pa-
tient must receive notice of the application and may demand a
court hearing, to be held within three days of the demand.'
Patients under the age of eighteen may request their own
release, or such a request may be made by the admitting agen-
cy or person, or by a person of equally close relation to the
child as the person who applied for admission initially.'
If a patient remains hospitalized on a voluntary basis,
MIIS must conduct a yearly review of the patient's status to
determine if there is reason to doubt the patient's suitability
and willingness for continued voluntary commitment.2 If
such doubt exists, MHLS must apply for a court order to re-
solve the patient's status.' A court hearing must be held on
this issue upon the request of the patient, MILS or a person
acting on behalf of the patient.'
Id. § 47.01; see id. §§ 9.25(a), 9.29, 9.31(a).
Id. § 9.09; Perez Telephone Interview, supra note 116.
'2' N.Y. fENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.13(b).
SId.
Perez Telephone Interview, supra note 116.




128 Id. A person may also apply for admission to a mental hospital on an infor-
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B. Involuntary Admission Procedures
The statutorily mandated procedure for involuntary admis-
sions, contained in New York Mental Hygiene Law section
9.27, is substantially more rigorous than for voluntary pa-
tients. As with voluntary admissions, application for involun-
tary admission is required and may be made by a number of
persons and agencies, including relatives of the patient, per-
sons with whom the patient lives, or agencies that are in some
way responsible for the care or welfare of the patient. 129 A
person "alleged to be mentally ill and in need of involuntary
care and treatment" may be admitted as an involuntary pa-
tient.13
0
Applications for involuntary admission must include a
statement of facts, executed under penalty of peijury, "upon
which the allegation of mental illness and need for care and
treatment are -based."131 Unlike voluntary admissions, the ap-
plication must be accompanied by separate certificates of two
examining physicians.132 Before completing the certificate of
mal basis. Although the standards for informal admissions are the same as volun-
tary admissions, an informal patient may leave the hospital at any time without
filing a written application for release. Id. § 9.15.
123 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.27. The need for immediate hospitalization must
be confirmed by a staff physician, and within 72 hours a third physician must
certify that the patient is in need of involuntary care. Id. Involuntary admissions
can also be made on the application of a director of community services, or the
director's designee, upon certification that the person "has an illness for which im-
mediate care and treatment in a hospital is appropriate and which is likely to
result in serious harm to himself or others." Id. § 9.37.
130 Id. § 9.27(a). A person 'in need of involuntary care and treatment" is some-
one who "has a mental illness for which care and treatment in a hospital is es-
sential to such person's welfare and whose judgment is so impaired that he is
unable to understand the need for such care and treatment." Id. § 9.01.
Likelihood to result in serious harm" is defined as "(a) a substantial risk
of physical harm to the person as manifested by threats of or attempts
at suicide or serious bodily harm or other conduct demonstrating that the
person is dangerous to himself or herself, or (b) a substantial risk of
physical harm to other persons as manifested by homicidal or other vio-
lent behavior by which others are placed in r~asonable fear of serious
physical harm.
Id.
131 Id. § 9.27(c). The procedures for involuntary admission based on the certifi-
cate of the director of community services and on an emergency basis vary slightly
from the admission on medical certification. See id. §§ 9.37, 9.39. However, many
of the procedural safeguards afforded by § 9.27 apply to these types of admissions.
1 Id. § 9.27(a). The examining physicians may conduct the examination of the
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examination, alternative, less restrictive forms of care and
treatment short of involuntary admission must be considered
to determine if they would adequately provide for the person's
needs.ss Prior to admission a third physician, who must be a
member of the hospital staff to which the patient is brought
and may not be one of the original examining physicians, must
then examine the person."34 Only if this third physician finds
the person in need of involuntary commitment may the patient
be admitted."s MHLS must immediately receive notice of a
patient's involuntary admission and must inform the patient of
his or her statutory rights."'
An involuntary patient may be held for up to sixty days
without court authorization, but if no authorization is ob-
tained, the patient must be released within this period of
time."3 7 The patient, or a relative or friend, may contest his
or her involuntary admission and request a hearing.ls" The
request for a hearing must be forwarded to the appropriate
court in the county designated by the patient, a copy of the
notice and record must be sent to MHLS, and a hearing must
be held.3 9 If after examining the patient and hearing testimo-
ny the court determines that the patient is in need of invol-
untary care, the patient will be retained.4 ' However, if it is
determined that relatives of the patient, "or a committee of his
person," are willing and able to care for the patient, he may be
released to such person's care. 4'
person jointly, but each must complete a certificate of admission. Id.
I Id § 9.27(d). If the person is known to have been under prior treatment,
the examining physician must, insofar as possible, contact the physician furnishing
prior treatment before completing the certificate of admission. Id.
13 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.27(e).
1 Id. Written notice of the person's admission must promptly be given to
M0ILS as well as the nearest relative of the patient or as many as three designat-
ed persons. Id. §§ 9.27(f), 9.27(b)(2).
Id. § 9.29(a)-(b).
" Id. § 9.33(a).
I& § 9.31(a). The patient may designate the jurisdiction in which the hear-
ing will be held, subject to a request for change of venue by any interested party.
The court must then fix the date of the hearing within five days of receiving
notice, and the patient, as well as MHIS, must be advised of this date. Id.
§ 9.31(a), (c).
11 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.31(b).




Review of a court authorization for retention of an involun-
tary patient provides an additional safeguard.12 Patients
may challenge a denial of release within thirty days of a reten-
tion order and receive a jury trial on the question of mental
illness and the need to be retained.' If the jury or court in
bench trials determines that the patient is not in need of invol-
untary commitment, the patient must be released immediate-
ly.144
Additionally, each patient, regardless of admission status,
has a statutory right to care and treatment "that is suited to
his needs and skillfully, safely, and humanely administered
with full respect for his dignity and personal integrity."45
This treatment must include full medical and psychological
reexaminations and evaluations of the patient at least once a
year.146 Similarly, each patient must be provided with an in-
dividual service plan that is "commensurate with each
patient's needs and well-being, the well-being of others, and
[is] least restrictive to the patient's rights.' 47
C. The Shortcomings of New York's Commitment Statutes
1. Constitutionality of New York's Mental Hygiene Law
New York's civil commitment laws were found constitu-
tionally sound in Project Release v. Provost.1 41 While these
statutes do provide some protection against wrongful commit-
12 Id. § 9.35.
143 Id.
'"N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.35
14 Id. § 33.03(a).
14 Id. § 33.03(b).
[ 119951 14 N.Y.C.C.R.R. § 27.3(a). The content of patient service plans must
be established by the appropriate staff members and must include a comprehen-
sive statement of the patient's "physical, psychological, social, economic, educational
and vocational assets and disabilities," as well as the goals of service to be provid-
ed based on the statement of assets and disabilities, and must "relat[e] to plans
for [the patient's] return to the larger community." Id. § 27.3(c)(1)-(2). A statement
of the methods and procedures to be used in attaining these goals must also be
included, and the staff members who will be involved in carrying out the plan
must be identified. Id. § 27.3(c)(3); see Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (holding that the state bears the burden of exploring less drastic alterna-
tives than inpatient care), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 863 (1966).
1. 551 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983).
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ment and meet the constitutional due process standards articu-
lated in Parham and other Supreme Court cases, gaps in these
procedural protections still exist, particularly as they are ap-
plied to minors.
In Project Release, a New York district court held that
both the voluntary and involuntary admission procedures are
facially constitutional because they contain several procedural
safeguards that minimize the chances of wrongful commit-
ment.' These statutes were challenged as overbroad and un-
constitutional because, inter alia, they failed to require that:
(a) the person to be admitted have a serious mental disorder
that is susceptible to treatment by existing medical and psy-
chological techniques; (b) that adequate personnel and resourc-
es be provided to afford a realistic opportunity for the patient
to improve; and (c) that a person receive the necessary help
through any less restrictive means.'°
In granting summary judgment for the defense on all of
the issues, the district court found that each of the elements,
the absence of which the plaintiff claimed rendered the statute
unconstitutional, was either already contained in the statute or
not constitutionally required." That the statute required a
finding of substantial mental illness for all types of admissions
was seen by the court as "not seriously in dispute," since only
patients in need of voluntary or involuntary mental health care
could be admitted under the statute. 2 Similarly, the court
found that a right to treatment is also present in the Mental
Hygiene Law, and while "medical science... may not assure
eventual improvement or freedom, the State may still consti-
tutionally confine for 'care and treatment' dangerous mentally
ill patients."'' While the court recognized that the state may
not constitutionally confine the mentally ill merely to ensure a
better living standard for them,' it reasoned that the Men-
tal Hygiene Law requires that more than custodial care be
given since individual treatment plans for all patients are
" Project Release, 551 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
"0 Id. at 1303.
151 Id. at 1310.
15 Id. See supra notes 114-115 and accompanying text.
'"Project Release, 551 F. Supp. at 1306 (noting that N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW
§ 33.03(a) requires individual treatment plans for all mental patients).
.. Id- at n.4 (quoting O'Connor v. Donaldson, 442 U.S 563, 575-76 (1975)).
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required, and so concluded that "New York does not purport to
provide only custodial care."155 Similarly, the individual treat-
ment programs must afford the patient "a realistic opportunity
to be cured or to improve," thereby meeting the plaintiffs chal-
lenge to the adequacy of treatment.156
The Project Release court further reasoned that several
procedural safeguards exist to ensure that only mentally ill in-
dividuals are committed, noting that a person may be volun-
tarily committed only if inpatient care is "appropriate" for the
individual, and involuntarily committed only if such care and
treatment is "essential" to the person's welfare."5 7 Also per-
suasive to the court were the requirements that three physi-
cians and a psychiatrist examine involuntary patients and
concur in the assessment that such care is essential;5 ' that
the examining medical experts consider alternative, less re-
strictive means of treatment before completing the involuntary
admission certificate; and that each of these experts have the
opportunity to disapprove the confinement.'59
The Eastern District court also noted that MHLS is under
a statutory duty to review all commitments, and a judicial
hearing on the need for commitment could be demanded by
... Id. at 1306; see N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.03(a).
... Project Release, 551 F. Supp. at 1306. Although the court recognized that a
non-dangerous individual could not be involuntarily admitted constitutionally with-
out a finding of dangerousness, it declined to accept the recent overt act standard.
Instead, "dangerousness" was more generously interpreted as including individuals
who could not properly care for themselves without such treatment. Id. at 1304-05;
see generally Rodriguez v. City of New York, 861 F. Supp. 1173 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(discussing dangerousness standard), vacated, 72 F.3d 1051 (2d Cir. 1995); Renelli
v. Department of Mental Hygiene, 73 Misc. 2d 261, 263, 340 N.Y.S.2d 498, 500
(Sup. Ct. Richmond County 1973) (finding that Department of Mental Hygiene has
the statutory responsibility to develop comprehensive programs for care, treatment
and rehabilitation of mentally ill and retarded).
157 Project Release, 551 F. Supp. at 1305; see Torsney v. Gold, 47 N.Y.2d 667,
394 N.E.2d 262, 420 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1979), overruled in part, People v. Escobar, 61
N.Y.2d 431, 462 N.E.2d 1171, 471 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1984). Torsney, a police officer,
was found not guilty of second degree murder by reason of mental disease or
defect and was committed to a psychiatric hospital. After less than one year, the
hospital petitioned for his release because he was found not to be dangerous to
himself or others. Torsney was ordered released two years after entering the hos-
pital upon being found not to be mentally ill and in need of immediate treatment.
Id. at 682-84.
1" Project Release, 551 F. Supp. at 1305; see supra notes 133-135 and accompa-
nying text.
... Project Release, 551 F. Supp. at 1307; see N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.27.
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several different parties, including IvIHLS and the patients
themselves." Noting these procedural safeguards, the court
characterized New York's commitment laws as being permeat-
ed by a dedication to patient's rights," and as "invit[ing] the
involvement of the patient, his family and friends" to safe-
guard against wrongful commitment."
The Project Release court paid little attention to voluntary
admission procedures. Rather, the court found these admission
procedures constitutional for the same reasons it upheld the
involuntary and emergency procedures: The commitment pro-
cess contained sufficient opportunity for medical and judicial
review to prevent wrongful admissions.'" At no time did the
court address how the procedural safeguards contained in the
voluntary admission statute might uniquely affect children
who are presented for voluntary commitment by their parents,
guardians or agencies responsible for their care and custody.
In omitting this consideration from its analysis, the court
failed to recognize that many of the protections it relied on to
find the statute constitutionally sufficient may not apply to
children, particularly those "volunteered" for commitment."
While the Project Release court's characterization of the
Mental Hygiene Law as being permeated by a dedication to
patient's rights may be accurate for the adult involuntary pa-
tient, serious questions exist as to whether this is so for chil-
dren. Several of the procedural protections relied on by the
court to find the Mental Hygiene Law to comport with due
process, such as multiple examinations and certificates of ad-
mission, statements of fact-signed under penalty of perjury-
and consideration of alternative treatment, do not apply to
children." Similarly, the court's emphasis on the statutes
"6o Project Release, 551 F. Supp. at 1307; see N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 9.13,
9.31, 9.33, 9.35.
161 Project Release, 551 F. Supp. at 1310.
1 2 Id. at 1307.
16 Id. at 1309.
164 See infra notes 183-203 and accompanying text.
I1 Compare N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.13 (allowing admission upon certifica-
tion and a single examination) with N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.27 (requiring
multiple examinations, certificates of admission filled out by each examining physi-
cian, a statement of facts signed under penalty of perjury by the party seeking




encouragement of the active involvement of family and friends
of the patient in the commitment process, and the additional
safeguard this caring involvement can afford, may be signifi-
cantly less applicable to children committed by parents who
cannot-or will not-care for the child, and for children volun-
teered for commitment by custodial agencies.
Significantly, the New York's voluntary admission statute
fails to specify the number and type of medical and psychologi-
cal examinations required, or who must conduct them, in order
for voluntary commitment to occur. 166 Presumably, the consti-
tutional standard articulated by the Parham Court must apply.
Accordingly, a child can be admitted voluntarily upon the ap-
plication of a parent, guardian or custodial agency after an
examination by a single doctor or mental health care profes-
sional."7 This is in contrast to the more stringent standard
governing involuntary commitment, requiring examination of
the patient by no less than three physicians who must individ-
ually certify that the patient is suitable for involuntary inpa-
tient care.'68 Similarly, while application for involuntary ad-
mission must include "a statement of the facts upon which the
allegation of mental illness and need for care and treatment
are based [which] shall be executed under penalty of peju-
ry, ss no such requirement is contained in the voluntary ad-
mission statute.70
Under lax standards of the current voluntary admission
statute, parents who are unwilling or unable to care for their
children may volunteer them for admission to a mental hospi-
tal, with little to stand in the way pf the child's commit-
ment. '7 That such abandonment does occur,'72 and that
many children are committed while in the custody of state
agencies and persons who are not the child's parents, argues
"6 Id. § 9.13. In 1952, only 20% of the states had voluntary commitment stat-
utes for children. Currently most states have such statutes. Ellis, supra note 88,
at 844.
" Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-06 (1979); see supra notes 86-103 and
accompanying text.
16B N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.27(a), (e).
1" Id. § 9.27(c).
170 Id. § 9.13.
171 Id.
17 Perez Telephone Interview, supra note 116. Mr. Perez noted that abandon-
ment by parents is not uncommon.
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against the Project Release court's reliance on the involvement
of the patient's family and friends to prevent wrongful commit-
ment. Where the "natural bonds of affection' relied
upon by the Parham Court are no longer present, the addition-
al safeguard of familial involvement is similarly absent.
In Project Release, the court repeatedly emphasized that
the Mental Hygiene Law requires that only persons who are
suffering from a mental illness and are suitable for commit-
ment can be considered for hospitalization. An assumption
implicit in the statute is that a voluntary patient recognizes
his or her own need for treatment and therefore has volun-
teered him or herself for commitment. For children, this rec-
ognition of a need for treatment may not exist because the
child may believe-ofen correctly-that he or she is not in
need of inpatient mental health care. As much of the literature
concerning the dynamics of committing children suggests,
parents often commit children who are not suffering from men-
tal illness-or from illnesses requiring inpatient treat-
ment-for reasons other than concern for the child's mental
health and well being.
2. The Best Interests of the Child
The decision to seek hospitalization is most often made by
parents who are rarely mental health professionals and whose
concerns may not be solely for the child, but for the "well-being
of the family as a whole."" This concern may cause parents
to commit a child who is not in need of inpatient treatment
when this course of action is seen as being in the best interests
of the entire family.' Moreover, the decision to commit a
' See Panneton, supra note 76, at 305 (noting that in New York State Ass'n
for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (1973), a case involving the
care and treatment of retarded patients in a state institution, "[dluring the course
of the litigation approximately ten percent of the parents of those minors involved
in the case could not be found.").
,' Parham v. J.R. 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
175 Project Release v. Provost, 551 F. Supp. 1298, 1300-01, 1303, 1305 (EMD.N.Y.
1982), affd, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983).
'76 See infra notes 194-216 and accompanying text.
17 RICHARD REDDING, DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS FOR JUVENILES IN CIVIL COM-
MiTMENT PROCEEDINGS 5 (1991).
17 REDDING, supra note 178, at 5.
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child may also be made as the result of an internal family
dynamic that has caused the child to be scapegoated for the
family's dysfunctions. 179 Similarly, parents who are them-
selves dysfunctional or disturbed may not be able to assess
their own role in the child's or the family's problems.18 The
result may be inappropriate admission of a child, initiated by a
less than objective parent who may, in fact, be mentally ill.181
Regardless of the mental health of a parent, the decision to
commit a child may come at a time of great family stress when
the parent is not thinking clearly or not willing to explore
other mental health options.182 Perhaps more disturbing, the
decision to commit a child may be the result of factors having
little, if anything at all, to do with the well-being and interests
of the child."
No formal, commonly accepted criteria for the admission of
children to mental hospitals have been adopted to determine
when inpatient treatment is appropriate."M In the absence of
such standards, "rather vague and overly broad criteria have
been promulgated," often by organizations that have a vested
financial interest in high admission rates."8 ' These criteria
are often vague enough to be used to justify the admission of
children who behave in ways that their parents or the commu-
nity disapprove of, but who do not need inpatient treat-
ment.8 6 In fact, many children have been admitted to psychi-
179 Id. at 6; see Ellis, supra note 88, at 852 (also noting that parents may make
the decision to commit a child at a time of great emotional stress and without
careful consideration of alternatives to commitment). Also, what alternatives are
available may be a function of the family's socio-economic status, making a deci-
sion to commit a child more attractive to a family lacking the resources to choose
alternative methods of treatment. Ellis, supra note 88, at 852.
' Ellis, supra note 88, at 862.
181 Ellis, supra note 88, at 859-62.
"2 REDDING, supra note 178, at 6.
18 See infra notes 204-221 and accompanying text.
8 See Profits of Misery, supra note 3, at 312-16 (policy statement of American
Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, suggesting that hospitals adopt a
standard for admissions of adolescents for inpatient care that includes that: "[tihe
psychiatric disorder should be of such severity as to cause significant impairment
of daily functioning in at least two important areas of the child or adolescent's
life, such as school performance, social interaction, or family relationships");
Weithorn, supra note 1, at 785-86 (noting that no such criteria have been offered
by the American Psychiatric Association or American Psychological Association).
Weithorn, supra note 1, at 785-86.
' weithorn, supra note 1, at 786. Weithorn notes that "fewer than one third of
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atric facilities for such illnesses characterized as personality,
conduct or transitional disorders. 7 The symptoms of these
disorders may include behavior such as truancy, promiscuity,
drug abuse, aggression, running away, persistent lying, or
stealing." In short, disorders that are viewed by many men-
tal health professionals as manifestations of normal childhood
developmental changes with transitory symptoms'" often
serve as the basis for commitment of children to mental insti-
tutions.19 Private mental health care facilities have taken
juveniles admitted for inpatient mental health treatment in recent years were
diagnosed as having severe or acute mental disorders of the type typically associ-
ated with such admissions (such as psychotic, serious depressive, or organic disor-
ders)." Weithorn, supra note 1, at 788; see REDDING, supra note 178, at 5; Ellis,
supra note 88, at 865 (noting that overdiagnosis commonly occurs, perhaps as a
result of the value judgment of the medical profession that it is better to err on
the side of caution).
187 Weithorn, supra note 1, at 789. A diagnosis of conduct disorder may result
from the observation of the child exhibiting a pattern of antisocial conduct over a
period of months. Similarly, a diagnosis of personality disorders, a category that
includes "oppositional disorder," "identity disorder," and "avoidant disorder," may
consists of the child showing pattern behavior including "stubbornness, violation of
minor rules, argumentativeness, and temper tantrums." Weithorn, supra note 1, at
786-90.
18 Weithorn, supra note 1, at 788.
169 REDDING, supra note 178, at 5; Weithom, supra note 1, at 791; see Profits of
Misery, supra note 3, at 312-16 (policy statement of the American Academy of
Child and Adolescent Psychiatry).
" Gay and lesbian youth appear to be particularly vulnerable to being diag-
nosed as having such disorders since "confusion over sexual orientation is often
considered a key symptom of borderline personality disorder," one of the frequent-
ly invoked justifications for hospitalization of youth. SHANNON MINTER, NATIONAL
CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, PROJECT TO STOP MENTAL HEALTH CARE ABUSE OF
LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER YOUTH 4 (1994). "Such confusion is a
recognized stage of the typical coming out process." Id. at 5 (quoting Richard
Troiden, Homosexual Identity Development, 9 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE 105-13
(1988)). For example, Lyn Duff, a teenager, was committed to Rivendell of Utah, a
private mental hospital in Salt Lake City, for no other reason than her homosexu-
al orientation. While at Rivendell, Duff was held in physical restraints, was sedat-
ed, and underwent "hold therapy" in which she was restrained by staff members,
screamed at and forced to admit that her lesbianism was hurting her family.
Bruce Mirken, Setting Them Straight, 10 PERCENT BREAKING POINT, June 1994, at
54. "Hold therapy" is similar to the "rage reduction therapy' described by Dr.
Duard Bok in his congressional testimony on abuses in psychiatric hospitals. This
therapy consists of holding the patient down while staff members verbally and
physically abuse the patient, often resulting in severe pain and bruising. As Dr.
Bok described, children were also confined in restraints for weeks at a time and
placed in "body bags." Profits of Misery, supra note 3, at 110-11 (testimony of




advantage of these malleable categories of disorders, often
tailoring their diagnoses to those covered by the child's insur-
ance policy.'
Contrary to the Parham Court's finding that parents usu-
ally act in the best interest of the child, in many instances a
parent's interests may be in direct conflict with those of the
child. Such conflicts may exist "where the parent is the com-
plainant against an allegedly disobedient child."9 ' Courts
have recognized this potential conflict, and in some instances
have acted to protect the child's interests.'93 Similarly, in the
context where a child is scapegoated for the pathology of the
family as a whole, or some of its members, or where parents
feel they cannot control the behavior of a rebellious child, com-
mitment may seem an attractive option. Such an option,
though, is in direct conflict with the interests of a child who
may be exhibiting signs of nothing more than normal childhood
developmental changes."
Also adding to the risk of improper admissions of children
are overdiagnosis and confusion over whom the admitting
health care professional is serving, the parent or the child.'95
At the initial examination there may be an understandable tendency
to "over-diagnose." In other words, a psychiatrist may be predisposed
to find illness rather than health at the first examination on the
assumption that it is better to err on the side of caution. Also, where
the parent admits a child for treatment, the examining doctor may
quite naturally identify with the interests of the parent. If either of
these happens, the doctor would be unable to act effectively as a
.-g-reening agent at the initial stage of the examination.196
... Profits of Misery, supra note 3, at 44 (statement of Louis' Parisi, Director,
Fraud Division, State of New Jersey Department of Insurance). Mr. Parisi also
noted that patients without insurance coverage were often referred to nonprofit
hospitals. Profits of Misery, supra note 3, at 51.
Ellis, supra note 88, at 857.
, See, e.g., Saville v. Treadway, 404 F. Supp. 430, 432 (M.D. Tenn. 1974) (per
curiam) (noting that it is essential that due process protections be applied to com-
mitment hearings for retarded children given potential conflict between interests of
parent and child); In re Sippy, 97 A.2d 455 (D.C. 1953) (court stripped a mother,
who had charged her daughter with incorrigibility, of right to control daughter's
legal representation or waive her doctor-patient privilege); In re Long, 214 S.E.2d
626, 629 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975); see generally Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418
(1979).
' See weithorn, supra note 1, at 825-26.
1' REDDING, supra note 178, at 702; see, e.g., In re Long, 214 S.E.2d 626, 629
(N.C. Ct. App. 1975).
1' Long, 214 S.E.2d at 629; see Elliot M. Silverstein, Civil Commitment of Mi-
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The admitting physician may turn to the parents when com-
mitting a child since they are closest to the physician in age
and social outlook, and may appear to be the most reliable
source of information."9 Where a parent wants to commit a
child, "the effect may be that the admitting or certifying psy-
chiatrist becomes-often unwittingly-the agent of the parent
in the parent-child confrontation. " "
3. Healing for Profit
In its holding, the Parham Court assumed that hospital
staff and administrators are sufficiently neutral in their evalu-
ation of a child to make an objective decision regarding the
child's need for care, and that only genuinely necessary admis-
sions will be made since the state has no interest in wasting
its mental health resources on healthy patients." However,
the privatization of the mental health care industry and the
dramatic expansion of this market in recent years call into
question these fundamental assumptions."'
In 1968, for-profit psychiatric hospitals did not exist."0 1
By 1982, corporations owned forty-three percent of the psychi-
atric health market share. 2 In the early 1980s, adolescent
psychiatric care was so profitable that many hospitals closed
wards used for traditional medical treatment, converting them
to adolescent psychiatric units which were not only more lucra-
tive than traditional medical care, but cheaper to set up and
nors: Due and Undue Process, 58 N.C. L. REV. 1133, 1147-48 (1980). While noting
that the risk of inappropriate admissions is present, Silverstein argues that impo3-
ing more procedural safeguards may degrade the quality of care of minor patients
by taking medical decisions out of the hands of mental health care professionals.
However, until mental hospitals are able to provide quality care for their patients
(which Silverstein, a mental health care practitioner, admits is often not the case),
it is disingenuous to argue against stronger due process requirements in the com-
mitment process. Id.; see Panneton, supra note 76, at 304 (admitting physicians's
"overidentification" with parent may cause erroneous admissions).
Ellis, supra note 88, at 868.
19 Ellis, supra note 88, at 868.
19 Parham v. J.R1, 442 U.S. 584, 605 (1979).
21 See generally Profits of Misery, supra note 3.
201 Weithorn, supra note 1, at 816.
20 Weithorn, supra note 1, at 817.
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maintain.20 1 With for-profit psychiatric hospitals as the largest
mental health care provider, an economic pressure to fill hospi-
tal beds was injected into adolescent mental health care.
Certain practices in the private mental health care indus-
try indicate that economic pressures do exist and that profit
motives have, in many instances, affected diagnoses and deci-
sions to commit children. Economic incentives have caused
many private mental hospitals to employ aggressive advertis-
ing and marketing strategies to attract new patients."
These strategies have included offering free seminars, given by
hospital staff to teachers, parole and probation officers, and
church and school counselors, aimed at predisposing these
adults to recommend private mental health treatment for chil-
dren who come to them for help or show signs of mental ill-
ness.20 5 Some hospitals even have used "bounty hunting"
strategies where staff members are given monetary rewards
and prizes based on their admission rates or referrals.0 6
Similarly, fear based advertising campaigns have been
used to target parents of rebellious teens.0 7 One hospital
even timed its advertising campaigns to coincide with the issu-
ance of school report cards, implying that hospitalization is
warranted for teens who have less than stellar grades.' 8
Such practices, although egregious, do not represent the ex-
tremes to which hospitals will go in order to attract patients.
Some hospitals have billed their services as 'Youth Programs,"
complete with trips to Disney World and the mall, rather than
203 See generally Beasley, supra note 4, at Al; Darnton, supra note 4, at 66;
Weithorn, supra note 1, at 817 (noting that in 1980 private hospitalization ac-
counted for 61% of inpatient admissions of adolescents).
204 See Profits of Misery, supra note 3, at 44 (statement of Louis Parisi, Direc-
tor, Fraud Division, State of New Jersey Department of Insurance), 61-62 (state-
ment of Curtis L. Decker, Esq., Executive Director, National Association of Protec-
tion and Advocacy Systems, Inc.); see also Darnton, supra note 4, at 66; Jones,
supra note 5, at 140; Moffat, supra note 4, at Al.
" See Profits of Misery, supra note 3, at 114 (statement of Duard Bok, M.D.,
Psychiatrist, Former Employee of Psychiatric Institute of Fort Worth, Texas);
Weithorn, supra note 1, at 820.
206 Profits of Misery, supra note 3, at 104 (statement of Russell D. Durrett,
Former Employee of Psychiatric Hospital); Darnton, supra note 4, at 66.
20 See Profits of Misery, supra note 3, at 477-526 for examples of advertise-
ments and marketing strategies used by private psychiatric hospitals.
21 Profits of Misery, supra note 3, at 62 (statement of Curtis L. Decker, Esq.,
Executive Director, National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems, Inc.).
[VCol. 62: 1687
CIVIL COMMITMENT OF MINORS
the inpatient treatment programs they actually are, duping at
least one parent into committing his children to a psychiatric
ward. 9 Even some adults who have responded to advertise-
ments offering free counseling have been committed allegedly
against their will.10
With the lax standards of commitment allowed under
Parham, doctors are able to diagnose children according to the
categories of mental illness that are covered by the patient's
insurance.' Similarly, for-profit hospitals often make liberal
use of discretionary treatments, providing unnecessary addi-
tional services for which they are reimbursed by the patient's
insurer.2' In some instances the services billed to the insur-
ers are never administered, and patient's charts are retroac-
tively altered to show reimbursable diagnoses and treat-
ments.213 It is also not unusual for patients to be discharged
22 Moffat, supra note 4, at Al.
210 Moffat, supra note 4, at Al. One factor contributing to the boom in adoles-
cent mental health care has been the insurance industry practice of providing
higher rates of coverage for inpatient psychiatric care than community based treat-
ment. While community based alternatives may provide more effective treatment
(particularly for youth who suffer from minor emotional disorders), and such treat-
ment may, in fact, be less expensive than inpatient treatment, any potential sav-
ings gained by opting for community based treatment is negated by the often
complete insurance coverage for inpatient care. With total coverage for inpatient
care, and significantly less coverage for community based services, commitment
becomes the cheapest option available to many parents. Insurers may be unwilling
to change their current reimbursement structure for fear that allowing coverage for
more community based treatments will increase the number of policy holders who
seek mental health care since full-time inpatient treatment is no longer the only
economically feasible option.
2. Profits of Misery, supra note 3, at 111 (statement of Duard Bok, M.D., Psy-
chiatrist, Former Employee of Psychiatric Institute of Fort Worth, Texas).
2 Profits of Misery, supra note 3, at 44 (statement of Louis Parisi, Director,
Fraud Division, State of New Jersey Department of Insurance).
213 Profits of Misery, supra note 3, at 103 (statement of Russell D. Durrett,
Former Employee of Psychiatric Hospital, noting that at one hospital, patients
were given 23-hour passes: So long as they were in the hospital before midnight,
all group therapy sessions held throughout the day were billed to the patients who
had taken advantage of the passes although they were not even on the hospital
grounds when the therapy sessions took place.). In one instance, computer generat-
ed stickers were placed on juvenile patients' charts indicating what therapy and
treatment sessions the children had attended. The chart of one girl who was re-
covering from hepatitis showed several treatments she could not possibly have




and miraculously "cured" when their insurance coverage is ex-
hausted, irrespective of the state of the child's mental health
at the time of release.214
In response to these abuses, some insurers have cut the
number of days for which they will provide complete coverage
for mental health care.215 Rather than curtailing questionable
industry practices, this may have only fueled the fire, making
competition for patients even stronger and leading to more
aggressive sales and recruitment tactics to fill empty beds.216
As these abuses come to light, it is evident that there is often a
substantial inducement to wrongfully commit children to inpa-
tient care, particularly to private hospitals. However, changes
to existing civil commitment statutes may lessen this risk.
4. Least Restrictive Means
Arguably, the risk of wrongful commitment of children
could be lessened by requiring admitting physicians to consider
alternative, less restrictive means of treatment. Although un-
der New York's involuntary commitment law the admitting
physician must consider less restrictive forms of treatment
prior to admitting involuntary adult patients, no similar re-
quirement is present in the voluntary admission statute.217
This is so despite the fact that commitment, even for a short
214 Profits of Misery, supra note 3, at 100, 111 (statement of Duard Bok, M.D.,
Psychiatrist, Former Employee of Psychiatric Institute of Fort Worth, Texas, stat-
ing that the hospital held daily "insurance remaining" meetings, and discharge was
only discussed for patients whose coverage was running out). In one instance, a
child was released one day after being held in solitary confinement for acting out.
Coincidentally, the child's insurance coverage expired the day of his release.
Beasley, supra note 4, at Al.
215 Cowley et al., supra note 4, at 50.
216 Moffat, supra note 4, at Al. The targets of these questionable practices are
not confined to the United States. Prior to 1991, a Canadian government program
that provided reimbursement for drug and alcohol abuse treatment was targeted
by private hospitals in the U.S. The hospitals went so far as to set up recruiting
centers in Ontario, paying "patient brokers" for garnering patients and infiltrating
Alcoholics Anonymous meetings in search of potential patients. The Canadian gov-
ernment has modified the program to provide $200 per day in reimbursement, and
settled all outstanding debts with American hospitals for 50 cents on the dollar.
Cowley et al., supra note 4, at 50.
217 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAV § 9.27, 9.13; see also Lake v. Cameron, 364
F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (requiring consideration of least restrictive means of
treatment for involuntary patients), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 863 (1966).
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time, may have a far more lasting and scarring effect on chil-
dren than hardened adults.21 Studies have found that mi-
nors committed to mental institutions are susceptible to a
lowering of social competence and intelligence, as well as se-
vere stigmatization.219 New Yorks voluntary commitment
statute currently allows a voluntarily committed minor to be
held for at least three days before less restrictive means of
treatment must even be considered.'
A minor committed "voluntarily" upon the application of a
parent, but against his or her wishes, must contact the director
of the hospital, usually through MHILS, to give written notice
of his or her desire to be released.2 The child will be re-
tained for up to seventy-two hours, during which time the
director may apply to retain him or her involuntarily. If an
application for retention is made, the patient may be retained
for another three days before receiving a court hearing on the
need for commitment.' Even if the result of such a hearing
is a finding that the child is not in need of inpatient care, it is
not certain that he or she will be released.' A child whose
parents or guardians cannot or will not take them back from
an institution is put in the custody of the Child Welfare Agen-
cy, which is charged with finding an appropriate placement for
the child.' However, such placements are not always avail-
able.' The limited number of beds available in foster care
and state run residential treatment facilities may cause the
21' Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 628 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see gen-
erally Thomas Szasz, The Child as Inuoluntay Mental Patient: The Threat of
Child Therapy to the Child's Dignity, Privacy and Self Esteem, 14 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1005 (1977).
21 Robert M. O'Boyle, Note, Voluntary Minor Mental Patients: A Realistic Bal-
ancing of the Competing Interests of Parent, Child and State, 37 SW. LJ. 1179,
1182 nrL21-27 (1984) (also noting that in many cases minors receive only custodial
care during commitment rather than care designed to treat the child).
22 NEW YoRK MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.13. This is assuming the minor patient
immediately apply for his or her release upon commitment. A hearing must be
held on the need for involuntary commitment within 72 hours of such application.
Only if the court finds involuntary treatment warranted will less restrictive means
of treatment be considered in accordance with the involuntary commitment pro-
ceedings. See id. § 9.13, 9.27(d).
221 Id. § 9.13(b).
2Id.
" Perez Telephone Interview, supra note 116.
2 Perez Telephone Interview, supra note 116.
Perez Telephone Interview, supra note 116.
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child to be returned to the mental institution, despite a judicial
finding that inpatient mental care is inappropriate, until a
placement becomes available. 6 Although no current figures
are available, one MHLS attorney reported that "several" chil-
dren each year are found to be wrongfully committed, but are
returned to mental institutions due to a lack of appropriate
placement. 7
As a result of such commitments, children who have been
found not to require inpatient care are confined by the state
under the guise of being treated for mental illness while, in
fact, the state is merely providing them with custodial
care.228 This is in direct violation of New York's statutory
mandate that an individualized treatment plan providing "care
and treatment that is suited to [the patient's] needs and [is]
skillfully, safely and humanely administered with full respect
for his [or her] dignity and personal integrity" be received by
every patient.229 A treatment plan devised for a wrongfully
committed child would be a sham, particularly since, by defini-
tion, such a plan must include inpatient treatment, which the
courts have determined is unnecessary. Similarly, it can hardly
be said that such a "plan" is administered 'humanely... [and]
with full respect for [the patient's] dignity and integrity."230
III. A NEW STANDARD FOR VOLUNTARY COMMITMENT OF
CHILDREN IN NEW YORK
While New York's Mental Hygiene Law meets the consti-
tutional due process standards articulated in Parham and
other Supreme Court cases, significant room for improvement
still exists, particularly since mental health industry abuses
226 Perez Telephone Interview, supra note 116.
' Perez Telephone Interview, supra note 116. Interestingly, the statute govern-
ing admission of children to residential treatment facilities spells out a detailed
process for determining whether such care is appropriate, which includes review of
the patients' records and diagnoses by a committee that has the power to require
additional examinations of the child. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.27, 9.51. No such
detailed process is spelled out in the statute governing commitment to a psychiat-
ric hospital, a more restrictive environment than residential treatment facilities.
See id. § 9.13.
See Project Release v. Provost, 551 F. Supp. 1298, 1306 n.4 (1982).
22 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.03(a).
'o Id. § 33.03(a).
1726 [Vol. 62: 1687
CIVIL COMMITMENT OF MINORS
and the risk of wrongful commitment are prevalent. Ideally, a
voluntary commitment statute must address the risks of
wrongful commitment, as well as the need for a scheme in
which patients truly in need of mental health care are not
discouraged or prevented from receiving it due to procedural
obstacles.
Due process analysis requires that consideration be given
to the private interests affected by official action, the risk of
erroneous deprivation through official action, and the probable
value, if any, of additional safeguards, as well as the
government's interest, including the administrative and fiscal
burdens the additional or substitute procedures would en-
tail." I With this balancing in mind, it is clear that the pri-
vate interest involved in civil commitment is of the highest
order. Civil commitment has been described by the Supreme
Court as "a massive curtailment of personal liberty," m and
the Court has recognized that even children have a "substan-
tial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for
medical treatment." '~s
The risk of erroneous deprivation of this liberty is substan-
tial for many children, particularly those who are volunteered
for commitment by parents who are themselves mentally ill or
otherwise unable to care for their children, or by state custodi-
al agencies whose "natural bonds of affection" for the child are
necessarily weaker than those of parents. Similarly, the pro-
cedural safeguards currently in place do little to discourage
wrongful voluntary commitment of children, particularly where
there is a financial incentive for parents and institutions to
admit the child. Additional safeguards that reduce the risk of
wrongful commitment would clearly benefit children by pro-
tecting their fundamental interest in personal liberty. More-
over, such safeguards may help to ensure that children receive
prompt and appropriate mental health treatment where some
treatment short of inpatient care is deemed necessary.'
231 Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 848-49 (1977) (citing
Matthews, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
's Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979).
The attitude among many psychiatrists toward procedural safeguards is that
they are often incompatible with effective treatment of the patient See Ellis, supra
1996]
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New York's involuntary commitment statutes address the
risk of wrongful commitment through several procedural safe-
guards aimed at reducing this risk. 5 Each of these safe-
guards could easily be applied to voluntary commitment of
juveniles and would reduce the risk of wrongful commitment.
The administrative and fiscal burdens associated with these
procedures are not so great as to outweigh the liberty interest
they would protect, nor would they impose unreasonable barri-
ers to the admission of truly mentally ill patients.
Applications for involuntary commitment must contain a
sworn statement of facts "upon which the allegation of mental
illness and need for care and treatment are based.""5 By re-
quiring a similar statement for the admission of children, the
added formality and threat of legal consequences for peijurious
statements may prevent parents from abandoning their chil-
dren in this way, as well as discourage inappropriate admis-
sions by private hospitals. Requiring such a statement of facts
would not discourage parents from applying for admission of a
mentally ill child. Rather, a stronger argument can be made
that the "natural bonds of affection" would encourage a parent
to inform the admitting physicians of all the facts regarding
their child's illness so that a more accurate diagnosis and
treatment plan could be formulated for the child.
Requiring multiple examinations of juvenile patients, like
those mandated for involuntary patients, would also prevent
wrongful admissions. 7 Currently, children who are volun-
tarily admitted need only be examined by a single physi-
cian. 8 Obviously, separate examinations conducted by sever-
al different physicians are more likely to result in accurate
diagnoses of children and findings of the need for inpatient
care, thereby helping to weed out those who have been wrong-
fully volunteered for admission. Also, wrongfully committed
note 88, at 867. However, one commentator notes that the assumption that proce-
dures harm treatment is predicated on another assumption-that treatment is
taking place-and in many instances it is not. Silverstein, supra note 196, at
1157.
= See supra note 132-150 and accompanying text for a discussion of the proce-
dural protections contained in New York's civil commitment statutes.
2" N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.27(c).
2" See id. § 9.27.
' See supra notes 167-178 and accompanying text.
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children will presumably be the ones most likely to challenge
their commitment. To prevent their release, the director of the
institution must apply for involuntary retention, and a hearing
must be held on the question of the need for commitment."3
Juvenile patients who have been examined by three physi-
cians, all of whom have come to the same conclusion-that
inpatient care is necessary-may be less apt to challenge their
commitment, thereby preventing the need for a hearing. Simi-
larly, three concurring diagnoses may weigh heavily with the
court if such a hearing is held, thereby limiting its duration
and the concomitant administrative and fiscal cost.
Perhaps most notably lacking in the voluntary commit-
ment statute is the consideration of alternative, less restrictive
means of care prior to admission. Consideration of alternative
means of care is required by the Mental Hygiene Law before a
patient may be involuntary committed.4 However, no simi-
lar standard exists in the involuntary commitment statute
despite the fact that the negative impact of commitment, even
for a short time, on children who are in their formative years
has been recognized by the Supreme Court and documented in
many studies." By incorporating a least restrictive means
requirement into the statute governing juvenile admissions,
the state could ensure that children are initially placed in a
setting in which they can receive appropriate care, thereby pre-
venting the damage to self-esteem and stigmatization that
often afflict children who are institutionalized. This too may
cut the state's administrative and fiscal costs since a child who
is receiving mental health care in an appropriate environment
may be less likely to resort to the courts to change his or her
situation.
2m N.Y. IENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.13(b).
240 Id § 9.27. Ironically, patients presented for involuntary admission are, pre-
sumably, those who are more obviously in need of such care, but other, less re-
strictive means of treatment must be considered before they may be admitted.
Alternative means of treatment need not be considered for children who are vol-
untary patients.




The drafters of New York's civil commitment laws clearly
intended that these statutes prevent patients from being
wrongfully committed to inpatient mental institutions. Howev-
er, the procedures dictated by these statutes do not adequately
protect children. The recent privatization of the adolescent
mental health care market has created an economic incentive
for hospitals to diagnose children as mentally ill and requiring
inpatient treatment when, in fact, such treatment is inappro-
priate. Contrary to the Supreme Court's assumption of nearly
two decades ago, 2 empirical and anecdotal evidence indi-
cates that parents, despite the "natural bonds of affection,"
often do not act in the best interests of their children when
committing them to inpatient psychiatric care.
Accordingly, civil commitment statutes should be updated
to reflect the fundamental changes to the mental health care
market and what we now know about the dynamic of parents
committing their children. The significant risk of wrongful
commitment present in allowing children to be volunteered for
commitment under the New York Mental Hygiene Law may be
lessened by importing three of the procedures required for
involuntary commitment into the statute governing voluntary
commitment: (1) an application for admission containing a
statement of facts upon which the allegation of mental illness
is based, signed under penalty of peijury; (2) separate exami-
nations by three physicians, rather than the currently required
one; and (3) an obligation to consider means of treatment less
restrictive than inpatient care before a child may be admitted.
Samuel M. Leaf
.2 See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
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